I had just begun reading Joe Posnanski's 9,000-word entry on the last decade of Kansas City Royals baseball when one quote brought my eyes and mind to a halt for a few seconds:
“What (Earl) Weaver NEVER used were the guy who didn’t do anything specific, but looked good in the uniform, the .260 hitters with 10 to 15 homers, a little speed and so-so defense.”
– Bill James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers.
Later on, Posnanski explains:
I put Bill James’ thought about Earl Weaver up there because Weaver always had a point to everything he did. That was his strength. That’s what made his teams great. Every move had a specific purpose. This guy played because he was sensational defensively, and this guy played because he got on base at a very high rate, and this guy played because he destroyed right handed pitching, and this guy played because he never walked anybody, and this guy played because he was magical on the double play, and this guy played because he stole bases at a very high percentage, and this guy played because he destroyed left-handed pitching. And so on. There was always purpose to the moves. Earl didn’t want guys who could “play baseball.” He wanted guys who could “do something.”
You might beat me to the punch, but why did this quote give me pause?
Because Mark Teahen is the exact player James is deriding.
Average out his last two seasons, and here's what you get -- .263 batting average, 14 homers, six stolen bases, and while there are sample-size issues due to the way he's been deployed, his defensive ratings haven't been encouraging at any position he's played. On top of that, his key peripherals are going in the wrong direction.
Now, you can't apply that 12-year-old notion by James equally to every situation. The Sox are one of those teams that, in previous years, may have been helped by an extra 90 OPS+, which sounds about what James is describing. Depending on the year, that would've been a godsend in center, left, third base, second base or shortstop. Mediocre-to-average players would have gone further in this organization than most, because there have been an awful lot of holes.
In 2010, however, now this line of thinking becomes dangerous. Jim Thome and Jermaine Dye are (probably) gone; Paul Konerko's into his decline phase. Carlos Quentin, the most crucial part of the 2010 team, is a big question mark. Alex Rios is streaky at best. Alexei Ramirez might not be a dynamic player. Gordon Beckham has to overcome the sophomore jinx.
Fearmongering isn't my goal here, but it does illustrate that the Sox don't have a guy in the lineup where you can say, "Barring injury, this guy will give you 600 PAs of 120 OPS+ offense, at least."
This is the environment in which acquiring Generic Q. Ballplayer ("Gene" for short) can't really help. In fact, there's a bigger chance his presence could make it harder on everybody. Simply put:
More guys with vague skill sets --> Fewer obvious decisions --> More ways a manager can screw it up
Ozzie Guillen may say he welcomes the challenge of a "flexible" lineup, but does anybody seriously think he would reject surefire pieces in order to mix-and-match? Nobody had fun trying to figure out a back end of the rotation while waiting for Jake Peavy to get healthy last year, and that's basically what Guillen would have to do with a lineup full of Teahens, Kotsays and Joneses.
Anyway, it's not my intent to bury Teahen before he even gets to his first White Sox spring training, but he was brought to mind for another reason.
The Boston Red Sox and Adrian Beltre agreed to a one-year, $9 million deal on Monday. Now, I don't want to be the jackass who says, "WHY DIDN'T THE SOX SIGN HIM?" It's more complicated than that. $9 million is a significant chunk of change for a guy coming off a sub-.700 OPS, and his right-handedness is another obstacle in the way of enhancing the White Sox's lineup. Plus, he might not have even considered a one-year deal for a team that isn't guaranteed a postseason berth.
I only bring up Beltre because he conveniently represents a contrast in philosophy. Acquring a Beltre type would be Weaveresque in that, even if he doesn't rebound entirely at the plate, he brings Gold Glove-caliber defense at third. He makes at least one part of the game look easy. Pick up a Beltre type, and you can say, "If nothing else, we improved our defense."
The Sox have made $11 million worth of moves, and they don't have any bold, declarative answers to show for it. They used to hit home runs with ease, which is no small feat. However, they dropped to sixth in the league last year, and haven't yet replaced the thunder. They've only countered with mild defensive upgrades that may or may not be real.
(Although if you count Rios as an offseason move, it looks a little better. It also provides a reason to be patient with him. Aside from the odd inexplicable drop, he can run and catch. He has reasons to exist, even if they may not be commensurate with his salary.)
That said, there's a chance the Sox's moves could pan out to a desired effect -- especially if they sign that power-hitting DH-type they're lacking. While nothing comes easy for the offense, the pitching staff is in a better position to string together quality starts than almost any other rotation, Phil Rogers be damned. That can mask an awful lot of stink, and if the rotation lives up to its billing and the various permutations of Teahen/Pierre/Kotsay/Jones/DH-to-be-named later types prevent holes from forming, that is a recipe for success in a weak division.
Posnanski's piece, though, is a great reminder of what a team looks like when everything you throw against a wall fails to stick, and a player like Teahen is the slippery slope. When a player looks like he can do a little of everything, he may not be able to do anything at all. And when you have a lineup full of those guys, you get the Royals.
One question I had while reading the Royal decade in review: Why do the White Sox and Royals see themselves as good trading partners?
I suppose the answer is that their swaps have been pretty even. The biggest Royals victory is Ross Gload for Andrew Sisco, and Gload actually contributed to the issue of too many halfway-decent guys. Meanwhile, the Sox scored the biggest with the Mike MacDougal trade. 'Nuff said.
It wouldn't be such a problem if they were forced by circumstance -- a player out of options, a guy blocking a talented younger player, etc. But it seems like when they look to each other for solutions, they only make problems worse (hi, Horacio).
And really, why would anybody expect the outcome to be any different? The Sox don't have much surplus value, and the Royals could stand to upgrade any position aside from Billy Butler's. There are organizations that flush out productive players (A's, Marlins, etc.), but the Royals and Sox aren't among them -- except when a player doesn't mesh with Guillen or the veteran core, that is.
It would probably be healthy for both parties to swear off not only dealing with each other, but picking up each other's scraps. This year might be the breaking point, if Teahen's slide continues and Brian Anderson actually starts for Kansas City. Yet if the failures leading up to this exchange of talent haven't taught them anything, there's no reason to believe they'd start learning now.
